intrODUCtiOn
Measuring, or profiling, physician effi ciency and quality of care is central to sev eral current initiatives in health care. Payforperformance and payforquality pro grams rely on identifying and reward ing physician efficiency and quality perfor mance (Rosenthal and Epstein, 2006) . In provider tiering, insurers rank pro viders by efficiency and quality (Robinson, 2003) . Consumerdirected health plans presume that consumers will have access to informa tion on provider efficiency and quality to help them wisely spend health care dollars (U.S. Government Account ability Office, 2006) . In addition, physician profiling is widely used by insurers to give physicians feedback on their performance, and to select physicians for insurers' networks (Sandy, 1999) . The Medicare Pay ment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) has called for physician profiling to be imple mented by the Medicare Program (Medi care Payment Advisory Commission, 2005) .
Several studies of physician profiling have appeared in the literature (Cave, 1995; Tucker et al., 1996; Hofer et al., 1999; Thomas, Grazier, and Ward, 2004; Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2006; Thomas, 2006) , but much remains to be learned about the feasibility, validity, reliability, and usefulness of provider pro filing. We conduct an exploratory study of physician profiling using comprehensive claims data on Medicare feeforservice (FFS) beneficiaries from a single mar ket area, defined as the Boston metropoli tan statistical area (MSA). Our empirical results are specific to the sample market area and time period studied, however, our methods are generalizable to other mar kets and time periods. We selected the Boston MSA because it has a sufficiently large number of Medicare beneficiaries and POs to support our feasibility analy sis, and because of our familiarity with this market, which helps us interpret and judge the face validity of our profiling results.
This study takes a populationbased approach to profiling. Profiles are based on care provided to patients during a calendar year, not during individual episodes of care 1 . Both cost efficiency and process quality indicators (QIs) obtain able from claims are profiled. Because individual physician profiles are unreliable (Hofer et al., 1999) , we profile POs.
MetHODS

Data
In this study, we use 100 percent 2002 Medicare FFS Parts A and B claims and enrollment data for 350,000 Medicare ben eficiaries residing in the Boston MSA. This MSA consists of seven counties-five in Massachusetts and two in New Hampshire. Our analysis sample includes all Medicare beneficiaries residing in the Boston MSA in 2002 who had at least one office or other outpatient evaluation and management visit, no months of Medicare private plan enrollment, who were continuously enrolled in both Parts A and B Medicare through out 2002 (for decedents, through date of death in 2002), and who had Medicare as their primary insurance coverage. These restrictions create a sample of beneficiaries who can be assigned based on their office visits to a specific provider and who have complete Medicare Parts A and B claims so that expenditures and QIs are compara ble across beneficiaries and organizations.
Area beneficiaries without any evaluation and management office visits in 2002 are not included in our analysis. Months of hos pice enrollment are excluded because the curative phase of medical care has ended and standard QIs are less relevant. Also, we excluded beneficiaries entitled to Medicare by end stage renal disease from the effi ciency profiling analysis because our case mix adjustment model was calibrated only for aged and disabled beneficiaries.
Medicare expenditures are defined as Medicare payments to medical providers in 2002 for Medicarecovered services, excluding hospice. Expenditures are annu alized and then weighted by the fraction of months in 2002 that a beneficiary is alive and eligible for Medicare. Per person expenditures were capped at $100,000 to reduce the influence of outliers.
identifying POs and networks
POs are identified by their employer identification number (EIN). An EIN, also known as a Federal tax identification num ber, is a ninedigit number that the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assigns to business entities. The IRS uses this num ber to identify taxpayers that are required to file various business tax returns. POs identified by EINs include solo practices, partnerships, traditional integrated physi cian group practices, physician/hospital organizations, hospital medical staffs or affiliated physicians, independent practice associations, management services orga nizations, medical foundations, and other organizational forms. Organizations identi fied by EINs can include multiple practice locations under common ownership or con trol. We did not contact the organizations to verify their structure, but we used a data file available from CMS to crosswalk orga nizations' EINs to their names. The large organizations identified by EIN in our data had face validity according to the authors' knowledge of the local Boston market.
We define physician networks as groups of affiliated POs. We study mutually exclu sive providersponsored networks such as integrated delivery systems, not highly overlapping insurersponsored networks. Physician networks vary in their degree of clinical and financial integration, standards for network membership, the amount of performance feedback they provide to network clinicians, the degree of practice standardization they attempt to impose on network physicians, and the extent of provider monitoring they engage in.
Physician networks are not identifiable in Medicare claims. We collected the names of POs affiliated with networks through pub licly available information, including inter net Web sites, newspapers, trade journals, and other media. EINs were used to identify the POs that are part of networks. While our method of identifying networks is not defin itive, we believe it provides a largely accu rate picture of the major physician networks in the Boston MSA.
assigning Patients
Since our physician profiling simulation is conducted on the Medicare FFS popula tion, beneficiaries are not enrolled in the profiled POs. However, for the purposes of profiling, it is necessary to attribute the services received by beneficiaries to spe cific POs. We assign beneficiaries to POs and networks that account for the largest share of their office and other outpatient evaluation and management visits (as mea sured by Medicare allowed charges). This algorithm assigns each Medicare patient to one and only one PO or network.
Our algorithm assigns beneficiaries to organizations and networks that provide a large enough share of their evaluation and management services to be held account able for the efficiency and quality of their care. Most beneficiaries receive the major ity of their outpatient evaluation and man agement care from a single PO, which is therefore in a position to coordinate their care. The average proportion of outpatient evaluation and management services that a Boston beneficiary receives within their assigned organization is 74 percent. Slightly under onehalf of beneficiaries (44 percent) receive 80 to 100 percent, about onehalf receive 40 to 79 percent, and fewer than 10 percent of beneficiaries receive less than 40 percent of services from their assigned organization. A previous study found that POs believe they have primary responsibil ity for the health care of patients to whom they have provided the plurality of outpa tient evaluation and management services (McCall, Pope, and Adamache, 1998) .
efficiency Profiling
Using the beneficiaries assigned to each PO, we define an efficiency index for the organization as:
Efficiency Index = (Actual Per Capita Expenditures) / (Predicted Per Capita Expenditures). If actual equals predicted, the efficiency index equals 1.00, meaning the observed expenditures of beneficiaries assigned to the PO equal the expenditures expected for these beneficiaries. In this case, the PO is neither efficient nor inefficient relative to expectations. If the efficiency index is less than 1.00, actual expenditures are less than predicted. The PO is more efficient than predicted. Conversely, if the index is greater than 1.00, the PO is less efficient than predicted. This is the standard statistic used in efficiency profiling exercises, that is often referred to as "observed/expected" (Thomas, Grazier, and Ward, 2004) .
Predicted expenditures in our efficiency index are based on average expenditures in the Boston MSA, either unadjusted or adjusted for various factors. Hence, effi ciency is measured relative to the average, not relative to the most efficient practices. An organization may be more or less effi cient than average, that is, have an effi ciency index above or below 1.00. An implicit assumption of the efficiency index is that expenditure variation that is not predicted is the result of variations in effi ciency, not other unmeasured factors.
We calculate efficiency indexes unad justed and adjusted for various cost fac tors. For the unadjusted index, predicted expenditures are the Boston MSA average and the efficiency index simply indexes assigned beneficiary per capita expen ditures relative to this average. For the casemix adjusted index, expenditures are predicted using a concurrent version of the CMS hierarchical condition categories riskadjustment model, or CMSHCC model (Pope et al., 2004) . The CMSHCC model is the basis of risk adjustment of Medicare capitation payments to private health plans and predicts per capita expenditures using assigned beneficiary diagnoses recorded on Medicare claims and demographic char acteristics from Medicare enrollment files. The concurrent version of the model uses 2002 diagnoses to predict 2002 expendi tures, rather than the 2001 diagnoses used in the prospective version of the model. The concurrent version may be thought of as a case mix rather than a risk adjuster.
An efficiency index adjusted for geogra phy is calculated by taking account of per capita expenditures in the county of resi dence of each assigned beneficiary when predicting their expenditures. County per capita expenditures reflect differences in intensity of care and in Medicare prices by county. POs drawing higher propor tions of their patients from highcost coun ties will therefore have higher predicted expenditures. Finally, we calculate an effi ciency index excluding Medicare indirect medical education and disproportionate share payments to hospitals. Physician groups or networks whose assigned bene ficiaries are disproportionately admitted to hospitals receiving these addon payments may appear to be inefficient; excluding these subsidies may provide a more accu rate measure of resource costs or quantity of services.
The difference of the efficiency index from 1.00 is tested for statistical signifi cance to determine the likelihood that the observed deviation is due to random fluc tuations in expenditures. Because we con duct a large number of statistical tests of significance, we use a 1percent signifi cance level in our statistical testing rather than the more usual 5 percent significance level. We conduct twotailed tests of the sta tistical significance of the efficiency ratio, i.e., whether it is significantly greater than 1.00 or significantly less than 1.00.
Power analysis of efficiency testing
The power of the statistical testing of the efficiency index is the probability that the statistical test will conclude that an organi zation's efficiency is different from average when it is in fact different from average. Eighty percent is the conventional stan dard for adequate power. Table 1 shows the power of the statistical test of the effi ciency index as a function of specified true differences of a PO from average efficiency and its number of assigned beneficiaries. With 100 patients, there is inadequate power to detect even a 50percent devia tion in efficiency. With 500 patients, about a 30percent deviation can be adequately detected. With 2,000 patients, about a 15percent difference can be detected, with 5,000 patients about a 10percent dif ference, and with 20,000 patients, about a 5percent difference. The conclusion from Table 1 is that sta tistical testing of efficiency indexes can reliably detect only quite large deviations in efficiency among practices with small to moderate numbers of assigned patients (e.g., 30 percent or greater deviations from average among practices with 500 or fewer assigned patients). Applying effi ciency profiling to small to moderatesized practices may be unfair or require aggre gation to larger profiling units. For exam ple, according to Table 1 , only 15 percent of practices with 1,000 assigned patients whose efficiency deviates from average by 10 percent will be detected by statistical testing of the efficiency index. Profiling will unfairly single out some practices as inef ficient, while not identifying other equally inefficient practices.
To avoid these problems, we restrict our efficiency profiling to individual POs with at least 2,000 assigned patients. The specific sample size of 2,000 is somewhat arbitrary, but strikes a balance between profiling a reasonably large number of individual organizations and achieving adequate power for our statistical testing of efficiency deviations. Table 1 indicates that with 2,000 beneficiaries our statistical tests have ade quate power at conventional levels (80 per cent) to detect about a 15percent deviation in efficiency.
Quality Profiling
As shown in Table 2 , we calculate seven claimsbased quality measures, including those for: (1) diabetes mellitus, (2) heart failure, (3) coronary artery disease, and In addition, we develop a composite qual ity score. While composite scoring has not been widely used in profiling health care services, research indicates aggre gated measures may improve understand ing of often complex profiling indicators by combining measures of many dimen sions of care into a single score (Landrum, Bronskill, and Normand, 2000) . We use a straightforward method to develop a com posite quality score (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2004) . The numer ators of all individual quality measures are summed to determine a composite numerator. The denominators of all indi vidual quality measures are also summed to produce a composite denominator. The final composite score is produced by dividing the composite numerator by the composite denominator. of the total MSA market, with a combined market share of only about 15 percent for the five organizations with 5,000 or more assigned beneficiaries. At the bottom end, about 40 percent of the market is comprised of practices with less than 250 assigned beneficiaries each. Only 30 POs have 2,000 or more assigned beneficiaries. Two thousand assigned patients is the minimum that we estab lish for individual profiling of POs. These organizations jointly account for about one third (35 percent) of the market. Thus, two thirds of beneficiaries in the Boston area are assigned to smaller practices for which efficiency profiling is not very reliable on an individual practice basis. We group these smaller practices by organization size (defined as number of assigned Medicare patients) to examine the relationship of size to efficiency and quality. The 30 POs that we individually profile include large independent group practices and hospi tal or health system affiliated POs. Almost all of the organizations are multispecialty, including primary care physicians, but one is a group of oncologists specializing in cancer care.
reSUltS
Market Structure
We also analyzed the market structure of physician networks. The largest physi cian network has 59,082 assigned benefi ciaries. Three other physician networks were identified, each having a market share of less than 4 percent. Each network has more than the minimum 2,000 benefi ciaries we are requiring for efficiency pro filing. However, only onequarter of Boston beneficiaries are assigned to one of these four networks. Table 4 summarizes the results of effi ciency profiling for large POs with 2,000 or more assigned beneficiaries, and for physician networks. All efficiency indexes are normalized such that they equal 1.00 for the Boston MSA as a whole. The mean unadjusted efficiency indexes for large organizations and for networks are greater than 1.00, indicating per capita patient costs above the area average. The range of the unadjusted efficiency index across individ ually profiled large organizations is 0.69 to 2.26, a 3 to 1 ratio. Across the more aggre gated networks, the range is smaller, but still substantial, 0.90 to 1.31. Adjusted for casemix differences the variation in efficiency is dramatically com pressed. The casemix adjusted range in the efficiency index across large organiza tions is 0.81 to 1.13, less than a 50percent variation. The range in adjusted network indexes is reduced to 1.01 to 1.10. Adjusting for case mix brings the mean index for large organizations and for networks much closer to 1.00, indicating that much of their unadjusted excess costs are due to a more expensive case mix of patients.
efficiency Profiling
Geographic (county of beneficiary res idence) and hospital payment addon (removing indirect medical education and disproportionate share payments) adjust ments further compress the measured range in efficiency, although not as dra matically as casemix adjustment. With all three adjustments-case mix, county, and hospital addons-the range in orga nization efficiency indexes is 0.90 to 1.11. This represents a reduction of 87 per cent in the range in the unadjusted effi ciency index, and a similar reduction in its standard deviation.
The majority (18 of 30) of large organi zations' unadjusted efficiency indexes are statistically different from the Boston aver age (1.00). Only 4 of the 30 fully adjusted indexes are statistically different from the area average. One of the four indexes, with a value of 1.11, belongs to the cancer care organization that has an unusually sick patient mix that might not be fully adjusted for by our casemix adjuster. Excluding this organization, the only two organizations identified as statistically inefficient have actual costs that exceed predicted costs by only 4 and 6 percent. The single organiza tion identified as statistically efficient has costs 10 percent less than predicted.
Similar observations apply to network efficiency. After all adjustments, measured efficiency is statistically different from the area average for only one network. This network's costs are 6 percent higher than predicted. Another network's costs are 4 percent higher than predicted, but this index is not statistically different from 1.00. It seems difficult to publicly single out the network with an index of 1.06 as the sole inefficient network.
After all adjustments, the mean effi ciency index of large organizations (1.01) is nearly equal to the metropolitan area aver age (1.00), and the mean efficiency index of networks (1.03) is only slightly worse than average (1.00). When we calculated mean fully adjusted efficiency indexes for patients assigned to eight size ranges of organizations (from less than 100 assigned Medicare patients to 10,000 or more), we found little variation in efficiency by orga nization size. Mean efficiency varied only from 0.97 (for organizations with 100 to 249 assigned patients) to 1.04 (for organizations with 10,000 or more assigned patientsonly 1 organization), and only these two extremes were statistically significantly dif ferent from the area average of 1.00. Table 5 provides results for quality profil ing of large POs and networks. For the qual ity measures used in this study, the Boston MSA averages range from 58 percent (eye exam and breast cancer screening) to 88 percent (left ventricular function testing), with a composite score of 67 percent. The composite score means that, across the seven QIs, eligible beneficiaries received the specified service at only 67 percent of the clinically indicated rate, leaving considerable room for improvement.
Quality Profiling
On average, the composite QI perfor mance of the 30 large, individually pro filed organizations equals the overall MSA performance of 67 percent. But QI perfor mance varies substantially across the orga nizations. The range in performance for the composite index is 22 percentage points, from 57 to 79 percent, and is larger than that for five of the seven individual indica tors. Lipid management and profile show the largest variation across organizations, and HbA1c testing the least. Composite performance was statistically different than the MSA average for 21 of the 30 large organizations, with 10 organizations having lower than average performance.
Although average performance of the four physician networks is also about equal to the MSA average, the differences in QI rates among the networks are much smaller than among the 30 large organizations. Network composite indicator rates range only from 63 to 68 percent. Nevertheless, composite indicator rates at two of the four networks differ statistically from the MSA average.
QI performance differs only modestly by organization size, as measured by num ber of assigned Medicare beneficiaries. The composite rate, 64 percent, is lower than average for patients assigned to 2 Sum of number of patients in numerator of individual indicators divided by sum of number of patients in denominator.
3 Organizations with 2,000 or more assigned Medicare patients. 4 Number of quality indicators statistically significantly different from the Boston MSA mean at the 1 percent level of significance.
SOURCE: Pope, G.C. and Kautter, J., RTI International, Waltham, MA.
the smallest practices with less than 100 assigned beneficiaries. It is slightly above average-ranging from 68 to 71 percent, on average-for patients assigned to organiza tions in three size categories, from 250 to 2,499 patients. Then it is about average, 66 to 68 percent, for patients assigned to the largest organizations in three size catego ries with 2,500 or more patients. The larger size, and presumably greater resources, of the largest POs, and of physician networks, does not translate into better QI perfor mance. But patients seen primarily by the smallest practices receive recommended services slightly less often than average. Organizations of all sizes can improve their QI performance. We did not adjust PO QI rates for patient characteristics, instead applying the same expectations to all populations. Adjusting for patient characteristics could affect rel ative performance rankings, for example, improving the ranking of organizations treating low socioeconomic status popula tions and narrowing the overall dispersion in performance. For example, the large organization with the lowest composite rate (57 percent, 10 percentage points lower than the MSA average) primarily serves a lowincome, innercity population.
relationship Between Quality and efficiency
If the highest quality POs are also the most efficient, Medicare, and other payers, could improve both the quality of care and its efficiency by directing patients to these providers. Also, providers that score high on both quality and efficiency could pro vide models for other providers to adopt. Figure 1 shows the relationship between quality and efficiency for the 30 large POs in the Boston MSA. Quality is measured by each organization's composite quality score and efficiency by its fully adjusted efficiency index. In the figure, high values of the composite quality measure indicate relatively high quality, whereas high values of the efficiency index indicate relatively low efficiency (i.e., higher than predicted costs). There is a statistically significant positive relationship between quality and efficiency ( Figure 1) , with POs exhibit ing higher quality also exhibiting greater efficiency (the tstatistic of the regression slope coefficient is 2.28, which is signifi cant at the 5percent level). The fitted line indicates that a 10percentage point in crease in the composite quality score is associated with a 3.7percentage point decrease in the efficiency index, that is, a 3.7percentage point reduction in cost of care. The relationship between quality and efficiency is statistically weak (the R 2 statistic is 16 percent), meaning there is considerable variation in the relationship between quality and efficiency among the profiled organizations.
COnClUSiOnS
We show that it is feasible to identify POs and their patients in Medicare claims, and profile the cost efficiency and process quality of care they provide. We find that patient case mix-and to a much lesser extent, geographic location and hospital payment addons-account for most (87 percent) of the variation in the per capita Medicare expenditures of patients assigned to large POs. After these adjustments, the efficiency of 4 of 30 large organizations dif fered statistically from the Boston MSA average. Residual expenditure variationwhich could be the result of efficiency differences, or of unmeasured factorswas within 11 percent above or below the area average.
We conclude that some possible effi ciency differences among large POs are identified, but proper adjustments greatly reduce the large initial cost differences. The potential savings from redirecting patients from inefficient to efficient orga nizations may be worthwhile to capture. But they do not appear to be particularly large given that only a few organizations were identified as having efficiency differ ent from average. Transferring all patients from the few least to the few most efficient organizations (even if that were feasible) would affect only a small proportion of the total patient population.
Among the 30 large POs, 21 provided composite quality that differed statistically from the Boston MSA average. The range of composite quality was from 57 to 79 per cent, compared to the MSA average of 67 percent. We conclude that there is mean ingful variation in process quality among the large POs, and some potential for improving average quality through patient reallocations from low to highperforming organizations. But as with efficiency, the quality differences are not so great, and the potential for patient movement so large, that substantial improvement in average qual ity can be attained by reallocating patients among organizations. Also, adjustment for patient characteristics affecting adherence to physician recommendations could nar row the observed differences among orga nizations. If observed quality differences among organizations are partly due to patient characteristics, patient movement from lower to higherquality organizations may improve overall average quality less than expected.
We find that POs exhibiting higher pro cess quality also tend to exhibit greater cost efficiency. We estimate that a 10percent age point increase in the composite quality score is associated with a 3.7percentage point reduction in actual versus predicted cost of care, on average. This implies that insurers will tend to improve both cost effi ciency and process quality by redirecting patients to organizations exhibiting either one. But the correlation between quality and efficiency is weak (R 2 of 16 percent). Insurers will need to explicitly identify organizations scoring highly on both effi ciency and quality to ensure that redirect ing patients will enhance both.
Our conclusion that redirecting patients among organizations has only a modest potential to improve average performance assumes that organizations' efficiency and quality is static. However, the threat of losing patients may spur all organizations to improve their performance, and could result in a significant impact on average efficiency and quality. Similarly, explicit incentives for efficiency and quality improvements supplied to all organizations by pay-for-performance programs have the potential to significantly improve average performance (Rosenthal et al., 2004) . In short, with static physician behavior the gains from redirecting patients are likely to be limited, but significant improvements might be realized from establishing dynamic market and financial in centives for improvement in all organizations over time.
This study has a number of limitations. We focus only on large POs, which account for about onethird of Boston area Medicare beneficiaries. Our statistical power analy sis shows that only large POs with 2,000 or more assigned patients can be reliably pro filed for efficiency. But feedback on large groups of physicians is less specific than profiling individual physicians or small practices. Methods of aggregating smaller practices-the extended hospital medi cal staff has been suggested, for example (Fisher et al., 2006 )-or combining multi ple years of data would need to be devel oped for efficiency profiling to be reliably applied to the majority of the beneficiaries in the market area.
We analyzed only one market area, the Boston area, which has several unique characteristics, such as a high concentra tion of teaching hospitals. Although our methodology is generalizable, our empiri cal findings may not generalize to other areas. We are constrained to QIs that can be measured in claims data, and conse quently were only able to examine seven process indicators, four of which focus on diabetes. Our measure of cost of care, payments, is not a perfect measure of resource costs, although it is probably highly correlated with resources used and it is what payers care about. Our case mix measure, although stateoftheart, may not incorporate all relevant patient risk characteristics.
Our efficiency index, although com monly used, is not directly actionable by physicians. We rely on populationbased profiling, which is more comprehensive and succinct, but less clinically detailed than episodebased profiling. Several feasible extensions would improve the actionabil ity of populationbased efficiency profiling. These could include comparing hospitaliza tion rates of assigned patients to market area norms, and profiling subpopulations of assigned beneficiaries such as conges tive heart failure patients. Another limi tation is that we assigned patients to POs based on their utilization, but some phy sicians may not feel responsible for qual ity and efficiency without explicit patient enrollment or choice of a primary care physi cian (McCall, Pope, and Adamache, 1998) .
Finally, and importantly, health out comes are not considered in our efficiency or quality measures. Efficiency is mea sured by the inputs used to treat patients with a certain diagnostic profile compared to the average resources used to treat them. Quality is measured by process indicators. If organizations that use above average amounts of resources achieve bet ter patient outcomes, they may be the most efficient organizations. Similarly, organiza tions that achieve better outcomes, even if they score poorly on process indicators, may be the highestquality organizations.
